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Fragmented Liberalisation in the Chinese Automotive Industry:
The Political Logic behind Beijing Hyundai’s Success in the Chinese Market

Seung-Youn OH

ABSTRACT [Words: 150]
This paper explains the extraordinary rise of the Beijing Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC), a
joint venture between a state-owned enterprise run by the Beijing municipal government and
Hyundai Motor Company. Within the span of three years, the BHMC soared to become China’s
second-ranked automotive manufacturer in terms of units sold. I highlight the role of the Beijing
municipal government in creating favourable market conditions for the BHMC during its initial
operation phase (2002–2005). The Beijing municipal government selectively adopted
protectionist measures and liberalising measures to promote its locally based company. I
characterise this practice as fragmented liberalisation, a system through which sub-national
governments discriminately apply WTO or central government regulations to promote their local
joint venture partner. In so doing, I also challenge the existing assumption that multinational
companies are the drivers of economic liberalisation, by showing Hyundai’s support for local
protectionism and industrial policy at the sub-national level.
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Introduction
How have China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the increasing market
competition in the Chinese automotive market affected Chinese sub-national governments’
industrial policies? How have they influenced automotive joint ventures (JVs) between regional
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and global automakers? What operational strategies can subnational governments in emerging economies employ to counterbalance open market forces and
protect local industries?
As a latecomer to the global automotive scene, the Chinese automotive industry serves as
an interesting case for investigating the delicate interplay of rules at the international, national,
and sub-national levels. At the international level, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001
reformulated the way that the country implements tariff regulations and liberalisation measures.
The WTO compelled the Chinese central government to lift more than 7,000 trade barriers and
pressured for increasing market access for foreign companies as well as equal treatment between
foreign and domestic businesses. At the national level, the Chinese central government has
consciously guided the developmental path of the automotive sector ever since it implemented
the country’s seventh five-year plan in 1986. In recent decades, the central government has
created a framework of market and non-market rules for sub-national governments and global
automakers by setting ownership regulations, local content regulations, taxation policy, and
corporate laws. At the sub-national level, provincial and municipal governments selectively
implement WTO policies and central government regulations in ways they hope will promote a
successful automotive industry. Fragmented and competitive dynamics are more salient in the
automotive sector than other parts of the Chinese economy, as sub-national governments own
automakers and attempt to create regional champions.
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In examining the interplay of these rules in the automotive industry, I argue that China’s
entry into the WTO ironically has empowered sub-national governments in two ways. First, it
allows the sub-national governments to continue to pursue their own industrial policies by
limiting the central government’s ability to implement interventionist measures at the local level.
Second, China’s WTO membership enables sub-national governments to introduce liberalising
measures as they see fit in order to promote their regional economic goals. I demonstrate my
argument by examining sub-national governments’ role in creating favourable market and nonmarket conditions for automotive JVs between SOEs and global automakers. Specifically, I
perform an in-depth case study of the Beijing Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC), a JV between
the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Company (BAIHC)—an SOE run by the Beijing
municipal government—and the Korean-based Hyundai Motor Company. As the first
automotive JV in China’s post-WTO era, the BHMC exemplifies how sub-national governments
can implement international and national regulations in ways that best promote their JV brands.
This article explains the BHMC’s astronomical rise, as it became China’s second-largest
automotive manufacturer in the span of three years, from 2002 to 2005. This achievement is
astonishing given 1) Hyundai’s late entry into the Chinese market, 2) Hyundai’s initially weak
brand recognition in China, and 3) BAIHC’s weak market position at the beginning of its JV.
Conventional market explanations cite three factors as instrumental in the BHMC’s
success: China’s entry into the WTO, Hyundai’s entry into the Chinese market coinciding with
the expansion of the country’s passenger car market, and Hyundai’s management strategies. I
find that these approaches do not adequately explain why the BHMC outperformed its
competitors in terms of market share, given that all producers were facing the same market
conditions. This article highlights the role the Beijing municipal government played in creating
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favourable market conditions for the BHMC during its initial operation phase (2002–2005), the
period when the government generally does the most to help a foreign partner settle into the
market.
Throughout this case study, I emphasise two main arguments. First, China’s sub-national
governments can selectively adopt their own protectionist or liberalising measures that deviate
from the wholesale liberalising measures that the WTO imposes on the central government. I
characterise this practice as fragmented liberalisation, a system through which sub-national
governments discriminately apply WTO or central government regulations to promote their local
JV partner. Second, multinational companies are not necessarily the main drivers of economic
liberalisation in China, as many scholars have suggested. Instead, foreign partners within subnational JVs foster fragmented liberalisation and often support protectionism. I begin by
delineating the characteristics of the Chinese automotive market and explaining my theoretical
framework of fragmented liberalisation. I then explain the BHMC’s fast growth and discuss how
the Beijing government and its protégé, the BAIHC, selectively implemented WTO regulations
to support the BHMC’s success within the framework of fragmented liberalisation.

Fragmented Liberalisation: Industrial Policy beyond the Nation-State
In view of its potential to create jobs and build industrial capacity, the automotive industry
remains one of the most strategic elements of national economic development. It is not an
overstatement to say that no country has succeeded in building an automotive industry without
government involvement in industrial policy. China is no exception. Following the
“Developmental State” models of Japan and South Korea, the Chinese central government set the
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automotive sector as a pillar industry in its seventh five-year plan (1986-1990) and has guided
the development of the industry ever since.1
China’s automotive development, however, differs from Japan and Korea in that it
highlights roles played by sub-national governments.2 First, Chinese bureaucratic and industrial
structures are extremely fragmented compared to those of Japan and Korea. Historically, Mao
Zedong’s “Self Reliance” (ziligengsheng, 自力更生) policy during the Cultural Revolution in the
1960s implored each province to build at least one automotive factory as an import-substitution
measure. This policy, however, failed to emphasise actual productivity or economies of scale. It
created extremely splintered market conditions, with 130 automakers and 2,000 to 3,000 parts
manufactures in China during the late 1980s.3 In these conditions of extensive local autonomy,
some sub-national governments served as “local developmental states” that created regional
champions, while other governments plunged into stagnation.4

1

Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice H.
Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989);
Meredith Woo-Cumings, (ed.), The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). For
automotive sector development in Japan, please see J.J. Tate, Driving Production Innovation Home: Guardian State
Capitalism and the Competitiveness of the Japanese Automobile Industry (Berkeley, California: The Berkeley
Roundtable on the International Economy, 1995).
2
For more on sub-national governments’ active roles in the market, please see J. C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off:
Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); G. Montinola,
Y. Qian, and B.R Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World
Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), pp. 50–81; Jae Ho Chung, “Preferential Policies, Municipal Leadership, and
Development Strategies,” in Jae Ho Chung (ed.), Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform
Era (London: Routledge, 1999); Jae Ho Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000); and Chuel Cho, “한중 자동차산업정책 변천 과정의 비교와 향후 전망 [Comparing the
Developmental Path of Auto Industry in Korea and China, and their future prospects],” Korea Institute for Industrial
Economics and Trade (2006).
3
For fragmented bureaucracy, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’
Model and Its Limitations,” in K. Lieberthal and D. Lampton, et al., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in
Post-Mao China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Chung, Preferential Policies; and Chung,
Central Control.
4
Yasheng Huang, “Between Two Coordination Failures: Automotive Industrial Policy in China with a Comparison
to Korea,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002), pp. 538-573; E. Thun, Changing Lanes
in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Government, and Auto Sector Development (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
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Second, while Japan and Korea were closed to foreign automakers, China’s reformminded leaders, including Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji, invited foreign automakers to
consolidate the country’s fragmented and inefficient automotive industry beginning in 1984.5 To
ensure China benefits from its relationships with MNCs, the Chinese central government
required foreign automakers to form a JV with a maximum 50 percent of ownership to be shared
with no more than two Chinese SOEs. Such ownership regulations not only affected the pattern
of market competition, but also restricted global firms’ options regarding two of their most
important business strategies—the mode and the timing of their entry into the market. Thus, the
new tide of reform created an “obligated embeddedness” for foreign automakers, whose
integration into the existing political and industrial structure of a given region depended partly on
their Chinese partners’ actions.6
Another tide of reform came with China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, which was hailed
as a significant step forward in opening China’s market and curbing government practices that
placed foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage. By entering the WTO, China was obliged to
revise various regulations in compliance with WTO standards. Most significantly, the WTO’s
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prevented China from implementing non-tariff
barriers—such as export subsidies, local content requirements, and separate regulations for
domestic and imported products [Table 1].

5

Huang, Review of International Political Economy.
Weidong Liu and Peter Dicken, “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct
Investment in China’s automobile industry” Environment and Planning A, Vol. 38, No. 7 (2006), pp. 1229 – 1247;
F.S. Sit and W. Liu, “Restructuring and Spatial Change of China’s Auto Industry under Institutional Reform and
Globalization,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 90, No. 4 (2000), pp. 653-673.
6
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Table 1. International Context: Chinese Automotive Market before and after WTO entry
Policy
Foreign ownership
Number of JVs for
foreign manufacturer
Import tariffs
on vehicles
Import tariffs on
vehicle components
Import quota

Import licensing
Local content
requirement
Distribution, retail,
after-sales service of
foreign makers
Automotive financing

Pre-WTO entry
Limited to 50%
Two per vehicle segment
(Sedan, bus and truck)
-1980s: 200%
-1990s: 80-100% on passenger cars; as low
as 9% on some other vehicles

Post-WTO entry
No change

15-50%

10% by 2006

-Varied by year, depending on number and
value of imported vehicles
-30,000 vehicles a year allowed from foreign
car markers
Foreign enterprises cannot directly import
vehicles
-First year of production: 40%
-Second year of production: 60%
-Third year of production: 80%
-Car manufacturers must use Chinese
distributors to sell their vehicles, and
domestic firms to service them
-Limited to wholesale by JVs
-No sales office for JVs
Foreign non-bank financial institutions are
prohibited from providing financing

-$6 billion per year
-20% annual increase until
elimination in 2006

No change
25% by 2006

Import rights granted within 3
years of accession
Elimination on accession
Distribution, sales, and service
rights for foreign firms phased
in over 3 years

Foreign non-bank financial
institutions are permitted in
selected cities prior to gradual
national rollout

Source: Compiled by the author from Holweg et al. (2005) and Noble et al. (2005).

Through its membership negotiations with the WTO, the Chinese central government
maintained control over the key issues regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow in the
automotive sector. First, ownership requirements remained intact, which heavily restricted
foreign partners’ operational strategies by precluding them from using traditional market
penetration tools, such as export and equity investment. Second, JV operation and key
automotive components projects (e.g., engine motors, anti-locking breaking systems, safety
airbags) required approval from the two most influential divisions in China’s cabinet—the State
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Economic and Trade Commission and the State Development Planning Commission.7 In addition,
China still assessed import tariffs—averaging 10 percent for vehicle components and 25 percent
for assembled vehicles—even after six years from WTO membership. Assemblers and partsmakers were prohibited from marketing their products solely under their global brand names and
were required to stamp the name of the local manufacturer or JV partner on all their products. In
other words, China’s central government reserved the right to assume an active role in shaping
the developmental trajectory of the automotive sector.
Scholars have offered many fresh insights about the negotiation process between the
WTO and the Chinese central government, but the resilience of China’s sub-national
governments has received less attention. Huang (2002) detailed how the Chinese central
government introduced foreign investors to help reverse the country’s trend toward extensive
local autonomy and regain power over the regions. Yeo and Pierson (2008) highlighted the
central government’s efforts to keep a firm grip on the centralised regulatory structure. However,
these approaches are relatively silent on how China’s WTO membership has affected the balance
between national centralisation and sub-national autonomy in the country. I argue that China’s
WTO membership has, ironically, given the country’s sub-national governments a newfound
autonomy to selectively adopt protectionist or liberalising measures at the sub-national level.
Under such conditions, local governments manipulate public policy to ensure favourable
market conditions and attract foreign partners, since foreign companies can furnish SOEs (and
thus local governments) with technology and capital. I describe this process as fragmented
liberalisation, where sub-national governments selectively adopt measures of liberalisation and

7

The State Development Planning Commission was renamed as National Development and Reform Commission in
2003. For administrative and regulatory changes in the automotive industry, see Yukyung Yeo and Margaret
Pearson, “Regulating Decentralized Industries: China’s Auto Industry,” The China Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2008), pp.
231-259.
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protectionism rather than wholly adopting liberalising measures imposed by the WTO on the
central government [Figure 1]. I also argue that multinational corporations (MNCs) are not
necessarily the main drivers of liberalisation, as many scholars have assumed.8 Instead, foreign
JV partners have fostered fragmented liberalisation in China partly because the JV formation
rules inevitably pit regional JVs against each other, rather than promoting competition between
domestic firms and foreign firms. Moreover, due to Chinese sub-national governments’
extensive local autonomy and the law that requires foreign automakers enter into JV partnerships,
nonmarket factors such as political bargains and coalitions at the national and sub-national levels
have shaped China’s automotive industry.9
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John Braithwaite and Péter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
James Crotty, Gerald Epstein, and Patricia Kelly, “Multinational Corporations in the Neo-liberal Regime,” in Dean
Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin (ed.), Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 117–143; Kees Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International
Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, “Towards A Global Ruling Class?
Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class,” Spring Vol. 64., No.1 (2000), pp. 1–54.
9
Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Lessons from European Firm Strategies in Asia,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in
Asia, European Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001),
pp. 257-280; Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Analyzing American Firms’ Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Asia,” in
Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York,
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 3-25; Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford, “The American Automobile
industry in Asia,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed,), Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for
Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 95-138; Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford, “The Fast
Lane to Asia: European Auto Firms in China,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed,), Winning in Asia, European Style:
Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 159-86; John
Ravenhill, “Nonmarket Strategies in Asia: The Regional Level,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in Asia,
European Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 5978.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework: Fragmented Liberalisation

Setting the Empirical Puzzle: Navigating China at “Hyundai Speed”
As early as 1983, automotive companies were among the first foreign investors to make inroads
into China to vie for market share in the world’s potentially largest automotive market. However,
not all major global automakers survived to establish a presence in the country. 10 Korea’s
national champion, Hyundai Motor, joined other global automakers and cautiously entered China
in April 2002. It formed a 50-50 JV with the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation
(BAIHC), with a registered capital of 1.8 billion RMB (US $217 million). Given China’s
proximity and market potential, Hyundai’s entry into China was surprisingly late. Nevertheless,
the latecomer BHMC outdid most of its competitors, jumping from ranking 11th in 2003 to 2nd
in 2005 in terms of unit sales [Table 2]. BHMC manufactured Hyundai’s best-selling car, the
Sonata, within 64 days of opening the production line and sold 100,000 Sonatas within the first
17 months of starting production, a feat that took Shanghai-GM 30 months. Within a year of
starting operations, the BHMC contributed to 37 percent of Beijing’s industrial growth in 2003,
10

Examples include the failures Guangzhou-Peugeot in 1998 and Nanjing-Fiat in 2007.

10

in a clear contrast to Beijing’s previously failed JV with the American Motor Company (AMC),
discussed later in this article.11 In 2003, Chinese media coined the term “Hyundai Speed” to hail
Hyundai’s unprecedented pace of auto production and market penetration. 12 This is an
outstanding achievement, given BHMC’s position as a latecomer in the market with weak brand
power and BAIHC’s relatively minor position among JVs. It is also remarkable considering that
automakers from Europe, the United States, and Japan already dominated the Chinese market
[Table 3]. How did the BHMC speedily penetrate the Chinese market, and what unique
characteristics contributed to BHMC’s success at “Hyundai Speed?”
Table 2. BHMC’s Market Share and Rank in the Chinese Automotive Market

2002
2003
2004
2005
1,002 52,128 144,090 233,668
Sales Units
Growth Rate
--510%
176%
61%
--0.99
2.01
2.90
Revenue($ Bil)
Increase Rate
----102
44
--11
5
2
Ranking
Source: Hyundai internal document released July 2011.

2006
290,011
12%
3.46
20
5

2007
231,137
8%
2.93
-15
8

2008
294,506
12%
3.61
23
9

2009
570,309
19%
6.75
87
4

2010
703,008
23%
8.91
32
4
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China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2004). It continuously grew to represent 570 thousand units in sales as
well as 6.7 billion USD sales revenues in 2009. The BHMC has created an estimated 80,000 jobs since its founding
up until 2010 (7,350 in BHMC and 70,000 in related parts companies).
12
Xiyou He, “Interaction between Transnational Corporations and Industry Clusters in China: The Case of
Automobile Industry,” in Akifumi Kuchiki and Masatsugu Tsuji (ed.), The Formation of Industrial Clusters in Asia
and Regional Integration (Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2008); Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报). 现
代速度拉动北京经济, 2003年10月20日http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20031020/0432480994.shtml.
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Table 3. China’s Major JV Automotive Assemblers in 2007
Start of production

Enterprise

Local Partner

Model

1984
1985
1991

Jeep (American Motor)
Volkswagen
Suzuki

Beijing
Shanghai
Chang’an

Cherokee, Grand Cherokee
Santana, Passat, Polo
Alto, Cultus

1991
1992
1996
1997
1998
1999

Volkswagen
Citroen
Nissan
General Motors
Honda
Kia

First Auto Works
Shenlong (Dongfeng)
Dongfeng
Shanghai
Guangzhou
Dongfeng Yueda

Jetta, Audi, Bora, Golf
Citroen ZX, Picasso
Bluebird, Teana
Buick, Sail
Accord, Fit
Pride, Qianlima

1999
General Motors
Jinbei
GR8
1999
Fiat
Nanjing
Paleo, Siena
2000
Toyota
Tianjin FAW
Corolla, Vios
2001
Ford
Chang’an
Fiesta, Mondeo, Focus
2002
Hyundai
Beijing
Sonata, Elantra
2003
Honda
Dongfeng
CR-V
2004
Benz-DaimlerChrysler Beijing
Mercedes Benz
2004
Toyota
Guangzhou
Camry
2007
Daimler
Fujian
Mercedes-Benz Viano, Vito, SPV
Source: Compiled by the author from press releases and company websites, and automotive industry yearbooks

Conventional market-oriented explanations cite three factors as instrumental in
Hyundai’s success in China. The first factor is Hyundai’s opportune timing of market entry in
2002, when the demand for passenger vehicles took off in China. However, this does not explain
how the growing demand for passenger cars translated into the demand for Hyundai cars. The
second factor is Hyundai’s global management experience and operating strategies from its
previous ventures in emerging countries like India. 13 However, instead operating as a wholly
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Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee, Choon-su Lee, Mi-Ok Kim, “북경현대차의 중국시장 마케팅 전략: 쏘나타
브랜드를 사례 중심으로 (Marketing Strategy of Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company in Chinese Market-Focused on
‘Sonata’ Brand Case),” International Regional Academic Conference (2007c); Christophe Wright, Suh Chung-Sok,
and Christopher Leggett, “If at First You Don’t Succeed: Globalized Production and Organizational Learning at the
Hyundai Motor Company,” Asia Pacific Business Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), pp. 163-180; Jae Chan Park and
Dong Sung Cho, “현대자동차의 중국 자동차 시장 진출: 북경현대 기차를 중심으로 (Hyundai Motor’s Entry
into Chinese Auto Market: the Case Study of Beijing Hyundai),” 한국국제경영학회 (International Business
Management of Korea) (2010), pp. 73-93.; Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee, Jihoon Oar, So yeon Kim, “A Case Study
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owned enterprise—as Hyundai does in India and the United States—Hyundai operates in China
as a JV with a Chinese SOE.14 The third factor is China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, which
subsequently curbed government practices that put foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage.15
Yet this does not adequately explain why the BHMC outperformed its competitors in terms of
market share, given that all producers were facing the same market conditions. Overall, market
explanations fail to capture how the locus of industrial policy often lies in the hands of subnational governments and how China’s entry into the WTO opened the door for sub-national
governments to adopt protectionist and liberalising measures.16
Recognising the politicised nature of the automotive sector, Thun (2006) explains
BHMC’s success by pointing to Beijing’s prior experience with the AMC. He argues that the
failure with the AMC prompted Beijing’s leadership to develop new political and economic
incentives vis-à-vis its new JV partner, Hyundai, and to undertake a laissez-faire approach by
granting Hyundai huge leeway in its operations. However, Thun’s approach misses the dynamics
of how sub-national governments have found ways to continue local protectionism even after
China entered the WTO and how sub-national governments strategically choose to use
liberalising schemes. In other words, Beijing’s laissez-faire approach to Hyundai is not the result
of incapacity as Thun suggests, but the result of strategic choice.
on Establishment and Partner Strategy of Beijing-Hyundai [북경현대 중국합작 회사설립 및 파트너 전략에 관한
사례연구],” International Trade Research, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007a), pp. 201-228; Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee,
Chun-Su Lee, “A Case Study on Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company’s Productions and Sourcing strategy [북경현대
자동차의 생산, 구매에 관한 사례연구],” International Management Reviews, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2007b), pp. 49-73;
M. Wright, 2005. “Strategy research in emerging economies: challenging the conventional Wisdom,” in Jo
Brudenell, et al. (ed.), Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–33.
14
Chuel Cho, “Globalization Experiences of Korean Automotive Industry and Implication for China,” Korea
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2008).
15
G. Noble, John Ravenhill, and Richard F. Doner, “Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the
Chinese Auto Industry,” Business and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2005).
16
Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford , “The American Automobile industry in Asia,” in Vinod Aggarwal (ed.),
Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003), pp. 95-138; Harry G. Broadman, “A Litmus Test for China’s Accession to the WTO: Reform of its StateOwned Enterprises,” in Sylvia Ostry, Alan S. Alexandroff, and Rafael Gomez (ed.), China and the Long March to
Global Trade: the Accession of China to the World Trade Organization (London: Routledge, 2002).
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Explaining BHMC’s Success: Fragmented Liberalisation at the Sub-National Level
China’s de facto decentralisation has enabled the country’s sub-national governments to play a
major role in enforcing WTO rules and the Chinese central government’s regulations. 17 The
Beijing municipal government was especially proactive in supporting BHMC as a way to revamp
its automotive industry. To better understand how the Beijing government and its protégé SOE
(BAIHC) assisted BHMC’s development, it is important to first explore the history of the
BAIHC and the formation of its partnership with Hyundai.
Established in 1958 as a SOE of the Beijing municipal government, the BAIHC reigned
as one of China’s leading light truck producers. The BAIHC became a pioneer in 1983 by
forming China’s first JV, Beijing Jeep Corporation (BJC), with the AMC to produce the Jeep
Cherokee for the Chinese market.18 However, without any precedents to serve as guidance, this
JV soon failed and became “a symbol of conflicting interests, hidden charges,
miscommunication and an unattained goal.”19 The BJC failed to target the mass market for its
sports utility vehicles and struggled through the 1990s, producing only 15,000 to 20,000 vehicles.
With BJC, the Beijing city government and the BAIHC displayed weak leadership by
failing to aggressively promote Jeep sales or adeptly manage BAIHC’s fragmented
organisational structure.20 Instead, they followed an import-substitution strategy by pressing the
AMC to follow local content regulations and to build indigenous parts suppliers. However, the
AMC was more interested in importing a complete kit containing the parts needed to assemble a
17

For decentralization and fragmented bureaucracy, see Liberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China ,
Liberthal Introduction, Chung, Preferential Policies; Chung, Central Control; and Yongnian Zheng, De Facto
Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing
Co., 2007).
18
In 1983, the BJC signed a 20-year contract and owned registered capital of 51.03 million RMB that 68.65% were
held by BAIHC and 31.35% by American Motor Company.
19
Noble et al., Business and Politics, pp.5.
20
Interview with a former manager at BAIHC-Foton in Beijing (June 21, 2009); Keun Lee, Chinese Firms and the
State in Transition: Property Rights and Agency Problems in the Reform Era (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe Inc., 1991);
and Thun, Changing Lanes.
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vehicle—complete knock-down. 21 It informally changed the requirements of local content
without properly executing written contracts. Beijing’s underdeveloped heavy industry base and
the scarce number of Chinese parts suppliers further complicated the enforcement of local
content regulations.22 The BJC struggled in providing the minimum wage requirements for its
employees, and its contributions to the local economy were meagre.23
Despite being China’s mecca of politics and culture, Beijing was unable to match
Guangdong and Shanghai in terms of industrial development. The failure was particularly bitter
for Beijing’s city leaders since Beijing had several features that were conducive to the growth of
future passenger vehicle market—including a topography of plains and plateaus, the highest
number of driver’s license holders in China, and a 100 percent increase in GDP during the late
1990s. Beijing also represented a large segment of corporate and government demand for
automobiles, accounting for 15 percent of total automotive consumption in China during that
period.24
To rejuvenate the anaemic BAIHC, the Chinese central government considered merging it
with a central government–owned automaker, First Auto Works (FAW).25 Immediately prior to
the merger, the Beijing leadership desperately sought a different partner to revamp the BAIHC
and help it obtain a share of the fast-growing passenger car market. However, due to a Chinese
government restriction that all foreign automakers were limited to a maximum of two JVs,

Eric Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995)
and Jim Mann, Beijing JEEP: A Case Study of Western Business in China (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1997).
22
For details of BJC, see Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry and James Mann, Beijing JEEP: A Case Study of
Western Business in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
23
The BAIHC and the AMC agreed in September 2000 to inject $226 million and extend its term by 30 years to
2033. See Eric Harwit, “The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China,” The China
Quarterly, Vol. 167 (2001), pp. 655-670.
24
Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2009).
25
Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (November 28, 2010); Interview with a company
spokesman, Hyundai Motor headquarters in Seoul, Korea (December 2, 2010).
21
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Beijing found its options for a JV partner limited to Hyundai and Toyota. Hyundai appeared to
be the perfect partner for targeting China’s booming middle class with its mid-sized sedans (e.g.,
Sonata and Avante XD).
The timing of Beijing’s invitation could not have been more serendipitous for Hyundai,
because the company was looking to enter the Chinese market as part of its global strategy.
Despite the geographic proximity between Korea and China as well as China’s market potential,
Hyundai had delayed its entry because of China’s protected market environment, strict
regulations on foreign partners, and the weak management of most existing Chinese enterprises.
Toyota’s failed bid with the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) in the mid-1990s
and Peugeot’s failure with the Guangzhou Automotive Industry Corporation in 1997 served as
further deterrents. Somewhat dubious of its chances in China in light of these many obstacles,
Hyundai instead elected to expand in other emerging markets like Turkey (1993) and India
(1996), with ambitions of becoming the world’s fifth-largest automaker by 2010.26
Though temporarily routing its capital elsewhere, Hyundai maintained its interest in
China and signed a $6 million contract in September 1994 with the Wuhan Wantong Automotive
Company to launch a knock-down assembly factory for mini-bus production. However, China’s
numerous trade barriers on automotive imports limited Hyundai’s exports to China to less than
10,000 automobiles per year. 27 To buttress its China operation, Hyundai sought a politically
strong and adequately capitalised partner like BAIHC that could 1) mitigate concerns about
unpredictability of the Chinese market; 2) offer strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the central
government; and 3) help overcome the disadvantages of late entry into the market.28

26

Interview with a researcher at Korea Automotive Research Institute in Seoul, Korea (December 12, 2010).
Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009).
28
Choosing Beijing as JV partner also enabled Hyundai to avoid overlapping of markets with its other brand in
Wuhan— Kia. Kia Motor set up a 50:50 JV with the Yueda group in 1997. After Hyundai Motor’ acquisition of Kia
27
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Micro-level Opportunity: BAIHC’s Failure and Revamped Partnership Choice
The failure of the BJC and the rumoured merger between the BAIHC and FAW compelled
Beijing’s municipal leadership to dedicate itself to the success of a second partnership and ask
for support from the central government. The central government opted to revamp Beijing’s
ailing automotive industry by cancelling BAIHC’s merger with FAW and participating in all
stages of Beijing’s partnership with Hyundai, from initial negotiations throughout the final
approval stage. In April 2001, Vice Premier of State Council, Wu Bangguo, organised a meeting
in Beijing between Jung Monggu, Hyundai’s president, and Jia Qinglin, Secretary of the
Communist Party of China Beijing Municipal Committee and a member of the Political Bureau
of the Central Committee.29 Their prompt negotiation to establish a thirty-year contract JV was
astonishing compared to SAIC–Volkswagen’s four years of preparatory meetings.30 The building
of Hyundai’s factory and start-up of operations followed at similarly unprecedented speed.
Following the central government’s initiative, the Beijing municipal leadership
endeavoured to expedite the actualisation of the JV. In May 2002, the Beijing Party Secretary
directed the Hyundai project task force team (qichegongyelingdaoxiaozu, 汽车工业领导小组)
chaired by Beijing Mayor Liu Qi to expedite administrative procedures and grant the requisite
approval for BHMC to commence operations.31 In addition, Beijing’s Development and Reform
Commission provided extensive support for land purchases, infrastructure development, and
personnel hiring. Hyundai purchased the Beijing Qingxing Light Truck Automobile factory in
Shunyi—1,800 thousand acres of land and infrastructure valued at 160 billion RMB—at a
Motor, Hyundai acquired 20 % share of Yueda Kia in September 2000. In March 2002, Hyundai, Kia, Dongfeng and
the Yueda group agreed to set up a new JV–Dongfeng Yueda Kia Motor with 50% share on Kia and 25% each for
Yueda and Dongfeng.
29
Interview with a former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office in Korea
(December 14, 2009).
30
Interview with a manager at German supplier company in Shanghai (September 14, 2009).
31
Interview with a chief researcher at Beijing office of Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (May 20,
2009).
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reduced price of 50 billion RMB. 32 Hyundai also received assistance in recruiting China’s
advanced engineers and skilled technicians.33 Such preferential treatment towards JVs is not an
unusual occurrence, but the degree to which Beijing assisted Hyundai is notable when juxtaposed
to its prior relationship with the AMC. This increased government support enabled the BHMC to
begin construction quickly in June 2002 and produce its first model within 65 days [Table 4].
The remarkable speed of Hyundai’s operation is more apparent when comparing it with Toyota’s
JV experience with Tianjin Automotive Company—an ordeal that lasted more than seven years
from initial negotiations to production.34
Beijing’s municipal leadership adopted two additional measures to help Hyundai settle in
the Chinese market. The first measure involved protectionism—promoting Hyundai’s model for
Beijing’s taxi fleet change preceding the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This case demonstrates that
China’s entry into the WTO has not prevented sub-national governments from navigating
through WTO regulation loopholes to continue local protectionism. The second measure was
more of a liberalising move—allowing Hyundai to transplant its suppliers from Korea to China
and abandoning the goal of developing indigenous companies. This was possible due to China’s
elimination of local content requirements under the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs).

32

Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009); Interview with a researcher at Korea
automotive research Institute in Seoul, Korea (December 7, 2009).
33
Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Beijing (March 31, 2009).
34
Interview with an executive at Toyota in Guangzhou (May 23, 2010).
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Table 4. Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company
2001
2002

April
May
June
July

August
September
October
December
2003
2004

March
December
January
December

2005

January

2006
2007

March
September
December
February
April
December

2008
2010

Wu Bangguo arranged a meeting between Jia Qinglin and Jung Monggu
JV contract was signed
Beijing government set up the task force team with Beijing Mayor Liu Qi as Chair
BAIHC and five shareholders collaboratively set up Beijing Auto Investment
National Economic and Trade Commission requested China International
Consulting Corporation to evaluate BHMC project and affirmed the basic outline
for BHMC project in principle
Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and Beijing Party Secretariat Jia Qinglin visited BHMC
BHMC received approval from State Development Planning Commission
BHMC established
BHMC started production and sales of Sonata, and started constructing the engine
factory
BHMC achieved 40% local content for EF Sonata
BHMC produced and sold more than 50,000 cars over the course of 2003
BHMC started sales of Elantra (Avante XD: yilante伊兰特)
BHMC sold more than 100,000 Elantras over the course of 2004, which was
selected as the most ideal car for Chinese family
Hyundai adopted as model for Beijing taxi fleet prior to 2008 Olympics
BHMC completed enhancing production capability for an extra 300,000 cars
BHMC introduced Accent (Korean model name Verna)
BHMC established the Second Engine Factory
BHMC produced more than 1 million engines
Production and sales exceeded 1 million units
BHMC completed its second factory
BHMC started the construction of its third factory

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.35

Local Protectionism with Beijing’s Characteristics: Taxi-Changing Plan
In addition to providing Hyundai with administrative support, the Beijing leadership decided to
follow other regional JVs’ pattern for success by using internal protectionism to favour locally
produced goods and locally based companies. In the automotive sector, several cases have shown
that regional protectionism is conducive to JV success. 36 SAIC-Volkswagen and DongfengCitroen in Wuhan strongly encouraged local goods and companies. When SAIC-Volkswagen
started operations in 1985, the Shanghai government not only purchased much of the output for
35

The History of Beijing’s Auto Industry and Beijing Hyundai (Beijingqichegongyeshizhibeijinghyundai; 北京汽车
工业史之北京现代), 网易汽车综合,(2010-04-17). http://auto.163.com/10/0417/14/64FT9EV800084BIC.html.
36
Harwit, Impact of the WTO Membership; Huang, Between Two Coordination Failures; Thun, Changing Lanes in
China.
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government use (including as taxis and municipal vehicles), but also assessed a surcharge on
sales to support a new fund for local parts supplier development.37
In similar fashion, sub-national governments devised various ways to directly and
indirectly manipulate consumer purchases and thereby promote locally based JVs. In the 1990s,
the Shanghai government charged a 10,000 RMB ($1,500) license fee for its JV partner
Volkswagen’s products while charging 80,000 to 100,000 RMB ($12,000) for other vehicle
models.38 As a result, Volkswagen seized half of the Chinese market for passenger cars. In 1999,
the city of Wuhan in Hubei province granted special tax relief to residents who purchased locally
made Citroen-Fukang models while imposing surcharge of up to 70,000 RMB ($8,400) to those
who purchased non-Fukang cars.39 SAIC-Volkswagen models, for example, cost twice as much
in Hubei province because of government-imposed “Relief Fund for Enterprises in Great
Difficulty (tekunqiyejiekunjijin 特困企业解困基金).”

40

Such non-tariff barriers of local

protectionism were prevalent in the 1990s.
Under such circumstances, the Beijing municipal government and the BAIHC wanted to
follow Shanghai and Wuhan’s success in using internal protection to create favourable market
conditions for Hyundai. The Beijing government’s commitment to support BHMC was apparent
from the very first month of Sonata’s production in December 2002, when the Beijing
government purchased all 2,000 units produced— taxi companies, the Beijing city government,
and the police purchasing 600, 500, and 300 units, respectively. Another sign of Beijing’s
commitment came during the city’s taxi fleet change prior to hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.

37

Ibid, (2006).
Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Shanghai (May 9, 2009).
39
Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Shanghai (May 16, 2009).
40
Dongha Kim, “WTO 가입이후 중국의 지방보호주의 여전” (Chinese Regional Protectionism in the Post WTO
era), Chindia Journal (POSCO Research Institute, 2006).
38
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By 2002, a majority of taxis operating in Beijing—including Tianjin Xiali, Citroen Fukang, and
Volkswagen Jetta—had reached the end of their six-year life spans. Expecting increased tourism
and media coverage, the municipal government mandated that all 70,000 of the city’s taxis be
replaced by 2007, with a renewal rate of 20 to 30 percent a year. The announcement spurred
major automobile makers to vie for the largest taxi market in China, accounting for 8 percent of
the country’s 780,000 taxis as of 2002.41
The Beijing municipal government recognised the taxi renewal mandate as a propitious
opportunity for Hyundai’s launch in China. Even before Sonata’s debut in the market, Liang
Jianwei, the director of the Taxi Management Division under the Beijing Communication Bureau,
announced the mid-sized Hyundai Sonata as the government’s first choice for its standard taxi
model.42 Such official remarks revealed Beijing’s preference for Hyundai models and signalled
new competition for domestic automakers. Liang’s statement provoked fierce objections and
sparked controversy among other automakers. Ultimately, the Taxi Management Division was
commissioned to draft a new standard for taxi models that would not restrict vehicle brands. All
vehicle makers and models were to have equal opportunity to enter the taxi market so long as
they satisfied government standards. However, the government still maintained considerable
leeway to manipulate these supposed standards.43
The 1,500 existing taxi companies in Beijing were free to choose any of the approved
models. As a result, major competitors lobbied taxi operators to purchase their models. Chery

41

Only in 2001, the fleet hauled 540 million passengers, and sported operating income of 8.17 billion RMB, equal to
a fifth of the city government’s operating budget.
42
“Taxi Officials on Song for Hyundai’s Sonata,” Beijing This Month (August 1, 2002),
http://www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/btm/2002-08/whathot/taxi.
43
The final standards include engine displacement lower than 1.8 litre，price no higher than 150,000RMB，the
length of the car no less than 4.5 meter，and a fully equipped GPS system. Cars that meet government standards
included BHMC Sonata, FAW Redflag, Audi and Cherry’s Eastar, and SAIC-Volkswagen Santana 3000. The cars
that received good appraisal in the Beijing market of FAW’ Jetta and already used taxi Fukang were excluded based
on such standard (Economic Daily News, August 7, 2001). http://auto.sina.com.cn/news/2001-08-07/12418.shtml
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Automobile—based in Wuhu, Anhui province—arranged holiday tours for Beijing drivers in
Wuhu in mid-September 2002 to feature its Eastar model. SAIC-Volkswagen unveiled the new
Santana 3000 model at the Beijing Auto Show and heavily promoted its in-car equipment,
including an updated global positioning system. Even with these added features, the Santana
3000 was marketed at 30,000 RMB less than the retail price of a Sonata. SAIC–Volkswagen
promoted excursions for Beijing taxi companies to visit Shanghai and other cities where Santana
3000 were widely deployed as taxis.44 Li Hongbao, an official with SAIC-Volkswagen’s north
China sales and service centre, disclosed that some carmakers paid for leaders of Beijing taxi
companies to travel to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.45 However, a number of Beijing taxi
firms were not able to “freely” choose what model they wanted because the municipal
government controlled their management licenses. Ongoing internal debates hampered the
Beijing government for more than two years following the announcement of the updated taxi
standard.46
Eventually, the Beijing municipal government and the BAIHC abandoned their plans to
choose only the Sonata for Beijing taxis. From 2005 to 2007, Beijing adopted Hyundai models
for 60.51 percent of its taxi fleet change, which amounted to 34,251 units. Although the use of
the Hyundai model for taxis did not directly influence consumer purchases, the increased
exposure of Hyundai vehicles affirmed its position in the Chinese market and demonstrated the
Beijing leadership’s commitment to support BHMC. Other JVs cannot criticise such local
protectionist schemes, except through informal lobbying. Executives from other JVs commented

Wu Zhong, Carmakers hail new taxi fleet for Beijing,” The Standard (October 7, 2004)
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=11047&sid=&con_type=1&d_str=20041007&isS
earch=1&sear_year=2004.
45
Interview with academic researcher at a university in Beijing (March 31, 2009); Interview with an academic
researcher at a university in Shanghai (September 16, 2009).
46
Interview with a researcher at a Chinese research center (April 4, 2009).
44
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that since most JVs have relied on similar strategies, they could not really criticize Beijing’s
practices.47
I argue that Beijing’s policy of supporting locally produced vehicles demonstrates how
sub-national governments selectively apply national regulations at the sub-national level and
navigate through possible loopholes in WTO regulations [Figure 2]. At the international level,
TRIMs and the WTO’s non-discrimination principle (Article III:4 of GATT) do not speak
directly to local protectionism. According to those rules, China cannot maintain separate
regulations for domestic and imported products once foreign goods are in the Chinese market.
However, the rules do not directly control cases where high intra-national barriers (rather than
inter-national barriers) hamper the entry of non-Beijing goods into the Beijing market. At the
national level, the central government has enacted several legal provisions to combat regional
protectionism and anti-competitive behaviour since 1980. Most recently, in 2003, nine
government bodies—including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Transportation, State
Administration of Taxation, and State Administration for Industry and Commerce—collectively
issued “Guidelines for Special Rectification of the Automotive Market” to counterbalance local
protectionism in the automotive industry. However, the central government often turns a blind
eye to the implementation of such legal provisions, in order to support the development of
certain local industries or does not have the capacity to implement nationwide regulations.
Ultimately, Beijing’s municipal government was able to get away with implementing partial
local protectionism for Hyundai in its own city. By proactively opening the city’s taxi market to
the BHMC, Beijing’s leadership protected its preferred local firm from competing JVs and
manipulated the domestic distribution of vehicles.

47

Interview with exectuives from two different JVs, one in Tianjin and one in Shanghai (September 14, 2009; June
5th, 2010).
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The promotion of locally made goods is not only in the regional government’s interest,
but also in the foreign partner’s interest. Hyundai had internal debates over using Sonata as a taxi
fleet vehicle, worrying about the depreciation of its brand image.48 Yet it came to an agreement
to support the taxi fleet upgrade plan and became one of the major beneficiaries of tacit
protectionism and fragmented liberalisation in China. China’s distinctive pattern of encouraging
intra-national competition between regional JVs rather than competition between foreign and
domestic companies motivates foreign companies to support protectionism rather than pushing
for further economic liberalisation.
Beijing’s taxi fleet change is an especially significant example, since China has not
signed the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which would open the door for
fair competition when foreign companies bid to supply goods and services to China’s
government. More than two-thirds of American states and all sub-central entities in the European
Union are covered under the GPA. Given that government procurement accounts for about 10 to
15 percent of GDP in most countries, China’s refusal to sign the GPA provides huge leeway for
the country’s sub-national governments to create arrangements that serve their own interests. The
United States and other GPA parties have demanded that China include sub-national entities and
certain SOEs in China’s GPA, but these demands have not included SOEs in purely commercial
activities––such as automakers.49 Therefore, the automotive industry will not be included in the
GPA even after China signs it, and regional governments will maintain significant leeway in
their dealings with automakers.
48

Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009); Interview with a researcher at Korea
automotive research Institute, Seoul, Korea (December 7, 2009); Interview with a Company spokesman, Hyundai
motor headquarter in Seoul, Korea (December 14, 2009).
49
Demetrios Marantis, “The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: A Tremendous Opportunity for China.”
Consulate of the United States of America in Shenyang, China (2010) http://shenyang.usembassy-china.org.cn/wtogpa.html.
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Figure 2. China’s Local Protectionism since Joining the WTO

Macro-Level Opportunity: WTO Membership and Bandwagoning to Hyundai’s Supplier Networks

BHMC’s supplier network development and sourcing strategy allow us to examine how WTO
membership has changed conditions in China, sometimes in unexpected ways. Developing
countries tend to use local content requirements as non-tariff barriers and follow an importsubstitution strategy by requiring foreign companies to purchase or use inputs of domestic origin.
International organisations, particularly the WTO, have strongly attacked these policies because
it creates barriers for operations of foreign businesses, but policy makers in developing countries
continue to be firm believers in their potential benefits. In the automotive industry, success
largely depends on developing a broad network of firms and suppliers. One automobile consists
of more than 20,000 parts, and 70 percent of a car’s value-added lies in components, compared
to only 10 to 15 percent in assembly. Recognizing the importance of developing indigenous parts
suppliers, the Chinese central government implemented a schedule of strict local content
requirements as early as the 1980s. Under this arrangement, each JV faces severe penalties if it
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does not meet a localisation content rate of 40 percent in the first year of production, 60 percent
in the second year, and 80 percent by the third year. However, the drive for quick localisation
and utilisation of Chinese parts has often hampered the level of vehicle quality and the overall
health of JVs, as illustrated in the case of BJC, the arrangement between Beijing’s SOE
(BAIHC) and the AMC.
Based on its experience with BJC, the BAIHC painstakingly learned about the drawbacks
of strict local content regulations, and thus shifted strategies to grant Hyundai greater autonomy
to organise local supplier networks. In practice, this meant bypassing indigenous firms that had
been the focus of earlier development efforts in favour of suppliers from other regions or from
the foreign partner’s home country. Utilizing outside resources is more effective than adopting
the institutional changes involved in cultivating similar resources at home. The BAIHC opted to
rely initially on Hyundai’s existing Korean-based supplier networks in order to expedite
Hyundai’s adjustment to China, avoiding the weaknesses in BAIHC’s fragmented intra-firm
structure. The BAIHC was able to take this course of action without receiving much political
criticism for abandoning the goal of developing indigenous companies, because the WTO’s
TRIMs and GATT Article XI: 1 allowed for the elimination of local content requirements. The
removal of these requirements allows companies to make parts-sourcing strategy decisions based
on business-related reasons rather than due to the political and legal conditions in China [Figure
3].
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Figure 3. Local Content and Supplier Network since China’s WTO entry

Despite the removal of local content requirements, Hyundai achieved 68 percent
localisation by the end of 2003, which increased to 96 percent by the end of 2009 [Table 5]. It is
important to note, however, that this increasing localisation reflects the increasing presence of
Korean suppliers operating in China rather than parts produced by indigenous Chinese
companies. For example, Hyundai brought its most important subsidiary, Hyundai Mobis
Automotive Parts Company, to China, and Mobis established five manufacturing operations in
Beijing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu to supply the BHMC with 100 percent of the Sonata’s core parts.
50

Mobis’s presence in China not only contributed greatly to the high localisation rate without

impairing parts quality, but also enabled Hyundai to establish a strong modular operation in
order to reduce production cost. This arrangement generated profits within Hyundai group
without ensuring much profit sharing for the BAIHC. Given Hyundai’s intimate working
relationships between assemblers and suppliers in Korea, receiving permission to replicate home
supplier networks was a significant factor in the company’s ability to expedite its adjustment in
China without compromising quality.
50

Mobis has 31 second-tier suppliers, 95 % of whom are Korean companies in China.
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Sourcing from Mobis also satisfies political needs in Hyundai Motor’s business
operations. The president of Hyundai Motor, Jung Monggu, owns more shares in Mobis than in
Hyundai, which strengthens Mobis’ influence on Hyundai’s sourcing decisions.

51

This

arrangement is different from the case with General Motors, which has an arms-length
relationship with its supplier firms. GM does not restrict its sourcing to Delphi, a GM-spinoff
supplier company that is now an independent firm. However, the relationship between Hyundai
Motor and Mobis creates an obligation for Hyundai to use its parts-producing subsidiaries
instead of focusing on Chinese partners’ in-group suppliers.52

51

For example, the President of Hyundai Motor, Jung Monggu, owns 7.9% of Hyundai Mobis and 5.2% of Hyundai
Motor. And, Hyundai Mobis owns 20.78% of Hyundai Motor.
52
For more details, please see John Ravenhill, “From National Champions to Global Partnerships: The Korean Auto
Industry, Financial Crisis and Globalization.” MIT Japan Program. (2001) Working Paper 01.04;Korean Institute
for Industrial Economics and Trade (Beijing Office) “Present and Future direction of development of Korean auto
companies in China [중국진출 한국자동차 업체의 현황과 발전방향], China Industry Briefing [중국 산업
브리핑] (2008), pp. 08-25; L. Shridharan, Industry and Corporate Competitiveness: The Auto Parts Industry in
China, Taiwan, South Korea and India (New Dehli, India: Wheeler Publishing, 1999).
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Table 5. Composition of BHMC Suppliers in 2003 and 2009
2003
Local content
development

Number of
suppliers

Korean company
(JVs/ Whollyowned enterprises)

45

Chinese

12

Total
57
Imports from
Direct supply from Hyundai in Korea
Korea
Source: Hyundai internal documents (2003).
2009
Number of suppliers
Korean company
Local content
(JVs/ Wholly92 (58%)
development
owned enterprises)
Chinese

27 (16%)

Foreign
41 (26%)
Total
160
Direct supply from Hyundai in Korea

Imports from
Korea
Source: Hyundai internal documents (2010).

Percentage

Parts

68%

Engine, manual
transmission, AC, seat,
car body
Audio, tire wheel, battery,
accelerator, alternator

32%

Percentage

94%

6%

Automatic transmission,
fuel injector

Parts
Engine, manual
transmission, AC, seat,
car body
Audio, tire wheel, battery,
accelerator, alternator

Automatic transmission,
fuel injector
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On a Same Bed Yet Different Dreams: Increasing Tension over Sourcing in the Second
Phase of JV Operation
The Beijing municipal government’s use of protectionist measures in its taxi procurement and
liberalising measures in its supplier network development contributed to BHMC’s “success at
Hyundai speed” in the Chinese market. Yet such arrangements tilt the balance of power between
JV partners in favour of the foreign partner as the JV operation matures. A foreign partner’s
increasing power in JV operations is almost inevitable in view of the foreign company’s control
over sales, purchasing, technology transfer, and production and quality control. Better
management skills, more competitive models, and pricing and creative marketing strategies have
become increasingly indispensable in strengthening a JV’s position among the fierce competition
of the world’s largest automotive market. Competitive market forces have pressured global
automakers to introduce updated technology and models in China in a timely fashion.
Meanwhile, the Chinese partner in an automobile JV typically contributes less effort
towards developing its own products, but fully shares in the benefits of increased market sales.
However, the asymmetrical power distribution within the JV has created a sense of crisis for
SOEs as they are squeezed by economic forces from above and below. From above, the central
government has heavily criticised SOEs for staggering behind foreign competitors and failing to
develop national or regional champions of independent models after two decades of government
support. From below, private Chinese automakers like BYD and Geely have fared well with their
indigenous models.53 The BAIHC lies at the centre of attention partly due to its close proximity
to the central government. In response to bureaucratic pressure, the BAIHC has strived to
53

Acknowledging the failure of “exchanging the Chinese market with technology (以市场换技术)” policy, the
National Development and Reform Commission in turn enacted the “Policy for the Development of the Automotive
Industry” in 2004. The new policy abandoned heavy JV regulation and instead encouraged self-reliant product and
local brand development. The approach aimed to launch globally competitive automotive groups that reinforce
independent R&D and large-scale production of key components, and nurture local suppliers and their international
operations.
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develop its independent models and parts companies. This effort has bred increasing tension
between the JV partners concerning BHMC’s sourcing strategy, as more than 90 percent of parts
are supplied by Hyundai’s suppliers.54 Given that 70 percent of a vehicle’s total value consists of
the cost of parts, the BAIHC was concerned that Hyundai would gain a majority of the JV’s
profit. Annual decreases in vehicle retail prices of 7 to10 percent heightened the BAIHC’s
apprehension, as it could lose more revenue through this depreciation. 55
Such tension prompted the leaders of the BAIHC and Hyundai to cease major corporate
decisions for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.56 This blew a brutal hit in their partnership as 50:50 JV
formation requires consensus from both sides for important decisions over management,
personnel and investment. The BAIHC even established its own parts company called Beijing
Hainachuan in August 2007. 57 The intense internal conflicts reflected directly on BHMC’s
market performance in 2007 and 2008, when it plummeted from 2nd to 9th in terms of unit sales in
China. Facing this economic downturn, both JV partners realised the damaging results of arguing
over localisation and sourcing. In early 2009, both partners acknowledged the integral role each
plays in the successful maintenance of JV operations. For the Beijing city government, the
BHMC helps propel the economy, especially after the Beijing Capital Iron and Steel Group
relocated to another city. Similarly, Hyundai’s Chinese operation risks failure without the
cooperation of its Chinese partner.58 As such, even though both sides have “different dreams”
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Interview with a chief researcher at Samsung Economic Research Institute 15 (May 11, 2009); Interview with a
former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office (December 18 2009).
55
In 2007, the leader in the market of Shanghai GM sold 500,000 cars with total sale of seven billion RMB, which is
10% of total sales amount. On the other hand, BHMC reaped only 4% of revenue of one billion RMB with 230,000
sales (Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 2008).
56
Interview with a company spokesman, Hyundai motor headquarter in Seoul, Korea (December 2, 2010).
57
It is a JV between BAIHC (60%) and Beijing Industrial Development Investment Management Company (40%)
with a registered capital of one billion RMB.
58
Interview with a former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office (December
18, 2009).
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about the role of JVs in developing Chinese indigenous suppliers, JV ownership requirements in
the auto operations make them have no other choice but to maintain the partnership in BHMC.

Figure 4. Fragmented Liberalisation and BHMC
What has not changed?
Local Protectionism and Taxi
WTO
level

TRIMs’ limitations on intra-national
barriers and local protectionism

What has changed?
Local Content and Suppliers
TRIMs’ prohibition of local content
requirements

China’s delaying in signing Government
Procurement Agreement
Central
level

Various legal provisions against local
protectionism

Elimination of local content requirements
upon accession

Subnational
level

Continued local protectionism
Non-tariff barriers at the sub-national
level

Adopting liberalising measures to enable
Hyundai’s supplier transplant

Result

Hyundai model for Beijing taxis

Over 90% local content

Conclusion
BHMC’s extraordinary rise was possible because the Beijing municipal government utilised
fragmented liberalisation—selectively adopting both protectionist and liberalising measures to
favour its local JV with Hyundai. At the micro-level, the failure of the Beijing’s previous JV
with AMC and the threat of a merger between BHMC and with FAW created sufficient political
urgency for Beijing municipal leaders to guard their own SOE. This urgency prompted the
Beijing government and the BAIHC to leverage public policy to ensure favourable market
conditions for Hyundai. At the macro-level, China’s entry into the WTO bestowed new
autonomy on the Beijing municipal government—not only to adopt local protectionist policies in
government procurement, but also to provide Hyundai with huge leeway to bring its own
supplier networks into China.
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On the local protectionism front, the Beijing municipal government used its control of
taxi companies to create demand for Hyundai cars. It was able to circumvent the central
government’s effort to create an integrated market in the automotive sector, and to navigate
through the limits of WTO rules that only control inter-national barriers and not intra-national
barriers. The continued practice of local protectionism demonstrates what has not changed since
China’s entry into the WTO and what kinds of developmental strategies are available to subnational governments in a global economy.
In terms of developing local suppliers, the BAIHC has relied heavily on Hyundai’s
supplier network in order to expedite Hyundai’s adjustment to China and the revival of the
automotive industry in Beijing. Empowered by the WTO rules that prohibit local content
requirements, Beijing was able to allow the full transplanting of Hyundai’s Korean suppliers
without receiving much political criticism for failing to nurture indigenous companies. This
strategy coincided well with Hyundai’s ability to draw on its existing relationships with suppliers.
The unexpected increase in the localisation rate of Hyundai’s part production in China, despite
the removal of local content requirements, proves that WTO membership has affected China, but
in a counterintuitive way. The BHMC case study also demonstrates that multinational
corporations are not, as many scholars have assumed, necessarily the main drivers of
liberalisation in China. In fact, foreign partners within sub-national joint ventures foster
fragmented liberalisation in the country.
The implications of this research extend beyond the sectoral scope of the automotive
industry and the national boundaries of China. The automotive sector served as an ideal case to
evaluate the developmental path of emerging economies, the role of the state in transforming a
country’s industrial structure, and the economic integration of local entities into global
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production networks. 59 First, the BHMC case study exemplifies how China promoted a local
industry sector while inviting FDI into different regions. This developmental path is situated
between Mexico’s total reliance on FDI and subsequent “dependent development,” and Japan
and Korea’s relative closure to FDI-oriented development. 60 Thus, the automotive sector
provides unique insight as to China’s developmental path, with its emphasis on non-market
factors and political influences at the sub-national level. Second, the case study reveals the
impact of external actors on China’s domestic economic development from the host country
perspective and the impact of foreign corporations in JV with governments at various levels.
China’s regulations regarding automotive industry ownership force foreign automakers to embed
themselves into the country’s existing configuration of industrial and government institutions.
And different FDI’s national origin and particular conditions of sub-national governments
display different dynamics. As such, this BHMC case study demonstrates what operational
strategies are available in emerging economies and how they interact with the power and
authority of the FDI recipient. Lastly, by explaining the delicate interplay of rules at the
international, national, and sub-national levels, this study highlights how WTO rules have
perversely granted China’s sub-national governments greater autonomy in engaging in subtle
anti-competitive practices at the regional level. In a decentralised and fragmented market like
China, sub-national level compliance explains the course of liberalisation better than nationallevel compliance.
59

For Chinese developmental path of investing FDI and its impact on the economic development, please see David
Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 2002) and M. Xia, The Dual Developmental State: Development Strategy and Institutional Arrangements for
China’s Transition (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 2000).
60
For dependent development, see Peter Evans, Development: The Alliance of Multinationals, State, and Local
Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 14-34; R. Kronish and K.S. Mericle, The
Political Economy of the Latin American Motor Vehicle Industry (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1984); Gabriel
Palma, “Three and a Half Cycles of Mania, Panic, and [asymmetric] Crash: East Asia and Latin America
compared,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 22 (1998), pp. 789-808); and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The
Economic History of Latin America Since Independence (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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